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Genres and Their Implications:
Meddlesomeness in On Curiosity versus the Lives1
Lieve Van Hoof
The Lives, so it is stressed over and over again, have an ethical aim. And so do,
obviously, the Moralia, or at least the group of writings within that corpus
which Ziegler (col. 637) labelled Plutarch’s “popularphilosophisch-ethischen
Schriften.” It is often interesting and instructive to compare Plutarch’s
treatment of one and the same virtue or vice in both groups of works, as has
recently been done, for example, concerning anger.2 Yet on the other hand
some of the vices Plutarch dedicated a whole work of the Moralia to do not
recur in the Lives at all. )dokesw¸a, for instance, is mentioned only regarding
Alexander in the Lives,3 and then does not have the same, negative sense it has
in On Talkativeness. Or again, it is said only once of a protagonist that he is
subject to compliance (dusyp¸a),4 on which Plutarch wrote a work as well.
Why, then, did Plutarch find these vices important enough to write a whole
treatise about them, and why do they receive little to no attention in the
Lives? 5
The current paper focuses on pokupqaclos¼mg. This case is somewhat
more complicated, in that the word pokupqaclos¼mg does occur in the Lives,
yet it is never, as will be shown, applied to a protagonist in the sense it has in
On Curiosity.6 In a first part, this paper therefore analyses what exactly Plutarch
1 I wish to thank Prof. Dr. L. Van der Stockt and Prof. Dr. T. Whitmarsh, as well as Dr.
P. Van Nuffelen, Dr. S. Verdegem, and J. Zeedijk for their useful comments on (earlier
versions of) this paper.
2 See, for example, Nikolaidis 1991, 172; Alexiou, 101–113; Duff, 87–89 and 210–
215.
3 Life of Alexander 23.7.
4 Viz. Solon 14.7. Note that in Brutus 6.9, Plutarch has the protagonist deem nothing
more disgraceful than to be subject to compliancy.
5 The terminus post quem for On Curiosity is Domitian’s death in 96. See Jones, 72.
Dumortier – Defradas, 263 assign the work to “l’époque de Trajan”, Inglese 1996, 29–
30 talks about “tra il 100 e il 120”, taking into account the relative chronology.
Although it therefore cannot be counted among the early works of Plutarch, many of
the Lives were written still after On Curiosity, so Plutarch did ‘know’ pokupqaclos¼mg
as intended in On Curiosity when writing at least some of the Lives.
6 The work, number 97 in the Catalogue of Lamprias, has not been treated often or
extensively by scholars in the past. Known to me are, except for the – mostly short –
introductions accompanying the editions of Helmbold, Dumortier – Defradas, Pettine,
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had in mind when adhibiting the word pokupqaclos¼mg in On Curiosity and
the Lives. In the second part, it explores some of the implications of the fact
that On Curiosity and the Lives belong to different genres in an attempt to
explain why none of the protagonists of the Lives is represented as subject to
pokupqaclos¼mg in the way that word is understood in On Curiosity.
1.1 At the beginning of On Curiosity, Plutarch defines pokupqaclos¼mg as
follows:
B pokupqaclos¼mg vikol²hei² t¸r 1stim !kkotq¸ym jaj_m (515D)7
Pokupqaclos¼mg is here defined as “a desire to learn (vikol²heia) other
people’s (!kkotq¸ym) evils (jaj_m)”. The three constituting elements of this
definition are given further attention in the rest of the work. In a first part
(§1b-3a)8, the stress is on the polypragmo¯n’s interest in other people’s affairs :
polypragmones cannot bear to look into their own souls. After that, the focus is
shifted towards the polypragmo¯n’s preference for evil things (§3b–6,
esp. 516D–F, 517F, and 518A). Dubious genealogies, seduced virgins,
adulterous wives, indicted processes, internecine struggles: these are the topics
that carry away his interest. The third, and longest part of the work (§7–16)
shows the polypragmo¯n’s desire to learn ‘at work’: his life is completely dominated
by polypragmosyne¯, in that he neglects his duties, is obsessively busy with
searching out other people’s evils, reacts impulsively or mechanically to
whatever he happens to notice, and, consequently, has no control over his
life.9 This last part of the work also contains the most elaborate therapy for
polypragmosyne¯:
l´cistom […] pq¹r tµm toO p²hour !potqopµm b 1hislºr, 1±m pºqqyhem !qn²lemoi
culm²fylem 2auto»r ja· did²sjylem 1p· ta¼tgm tµm 1cjq²teiam7 ja· c±q B aungsir
5hei c´come toO mos¶lator jat± lijq¹m eQr t¹ pqºsy wyqoOmtor. dm d³ tqºpom,
eQsºleha peq· t/r !sj¶seyr bloO diakecºlemoi (520D).
the greatest factor […] to avert this affection is habituation: starting from its
beginnings, to train and teach ourselves to acquire that self-control. It is, in fact,
through habit that the disease has come to increase, advancing, as it did, little by
and Inglese (1996), studies by Hense, Ingenkamp, Volpe-Cacciatore, Walsh, and
Inglese (1995). None of these studies, however, gave attention to the difference in use
of the word pokupqaclos¼mg in the Moralia versus the Lives.
7 Unless indicated differently, for On Curiosity, all text quotations are taken from the
edition of Pohlenz, all translations from Helmbold, whereas for all other ancient works,
both texts and translations are taken from the Loeb Classical Library.
8 §3a ends in 516D5 after the words bºsjousa ja· pia¸mousa t¹ jajo¶her.
9 This is not only elaborated theoretically – the polypragmo¯n, Plutarch states (§12), is
guided not by his reason but by his senses –, but also shines through gramatically, when
Plutarch uses verbs in the passive mode. See, for example, tqawgkifol´mour ja·
peqiacol´mour (521B), and diavoqoul´mgr (521C).
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little. How this habit is acquired, we shall learn when we discuss the proper
training (520D).10
From this passage, it is clear that what Plutarch has in view is not so much a
concrete act of curiosity, but rather a ‘disease’ developed (aungsir 5hei c´come
toO mos¶lator) over a longer period of time. In a first stage, the polypragmo¯n
reads every inscription he encounters. Then he starts prying into other
people’s houses. When the disease develops further, the polypragmo¯n wants to
be around when something happens on the marketplace, is unable to resist
when a successful show takes place at the theatre, when there is excitement in
the stadium or the hippodrome, or when a friend invites him to come and see
a (pantomimic)11 dancer or a comedian. Finally, he demands to hear and see
everything that concerns himself as soon as possible.
The overall impression, then, is of a man who is ‘hanging around’ in town,
and will stop people just in order to learn the latest news (519A), irritated if
there is none.
On a more abstract level, Plutarch interprets polypragmosyne¯ as an affection
(p²hor, 520D, 522B–C), and more specifically as a bad affection, related to
envy (vhºmor, 515D and 518C) and Schadenfreude (1piwaiqejaj¸a, 518C). As
such, Plutarch vehemently pleads against it as being shameful (aQswqºm),
harmful (bkabeqºm), and painful (kupgqºm) – what Aristotle saw as the criteria
for avoidance.12 As has been shown by Ingenkamp, these criteria are of primary
importance in Plutarch’s Seelenheilungsschriften as well: the demonstration that
the reader’s behaviour meets the criteria of avoidance instead of choice,
showing the danger and shame resulting from it, are to make the reader feel
distressed, and thus incite him to change his behaviour. What Plutarch offers
the reader with his work On Curiosity, is a therapy against polypragmosyne¯,
comprising three stages. The first step (§1b–3a) directly urges the reader to
actively examine and ameliorate his own soul. Yet as some people do not dare
(oqw rpol´mousim, 516C) to look into their own souls, the second remedy
(§3b–6) proposes nature and history as more interesting topics to direct one’s
attention to. Nevertheless, as nature is not bad and history not recent enough
for the polypragmo¯n, this remedy is bound to fail as well. The conclusion must
be that polypragmosyne¯ should be done away with quite radically, by thoroughly
10 I modified Helmbold’s, 501 translation. See also the following note.
11 Liddell – Scott – Jones s.v. aqwgst¶r give “later esp. pantomimic dancer”, the specific
word for this kind of dancer being pamtºlilor. Plutarch, however, never uses
pamtºlilor, and apart from that, the sequence of highly popular forms of entertainment
in which aqwgst¶r appears here, makes it likely that it denotes a pantomimic dancer. On
the popularity of pantomime, see Seneca, On Anger 1.20.8.
12 See Ingenkamp, 74–5. Note that the same criteria, albeit much less systematically, are
already mentioned by Plato, Republic II 363e–364a.
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changing one’s behaviour. The remedy proposed last in On Curiosity (§7–16)
therefore contains some very concrete advice for real-life situations in which
people reveal their being subject to polypragmosyne¯.
1.2 In the Lives, pokupqaclome ?m/pokupq²clym/pokupqaclos¼mg occur no
more than thirty-two times (on a total of some 115 occurences in all of
Plutarch’s works).
Of these already few occurences, only two apply directly to the hero of the
life in question. In the first case, Camillus, asked by the Romans to come back
from Ardea, says to be ready to do so if they elect him as their general, while
being careful not to meddle (pokupqaclom¶seim, 24.3) with anything without
a command.13 In the other instance, Eumenes does not openly take up a
standpoint in the quarrel between the soldiers and the officers after Alexander’s
death, explaining that it is none of his business since he is no Macedonian (¢r
oqd³m aqt` pqos/jom n´m\ emti pokupqaclome ?m 1m ta ?r Lajedºmym
diavoqa?r, 3.1).14 In both cases, the hero explicitly rejects a
pokupqaclos¼mg which would take him to carry out or meddle in something
which he has no (institutional, respectively natural) reason to busy himself
with.
On the other hand, the heroes of the Lives often curtail other people’s
pokupqaclos¼mg. Aemilius (Aemilius 13.6) tells his soldiers not to meddle
(pokupqaclome ?m) but to leave the war to him, and so does Pompey (Caesar
33.5) tell the people. Demetrius, on the other hand, starts a war against the
Aetolians because he notices that his people obey him on expedition, but are
turbulent and meddlesome (pokupq²clomar emtar, Demetrius 41.1) at home.
Antony gets involved in a war because of his wife Fulvia’s proclivity to
intrigues (v¼sei l³m owsam pokupq²cloma, Antony 30.4). Alexander grapples
with the same problem in a better way: he honours his mother but does not
allow her to meddle in affairs (oqj eUa d³ pokupqaclome ?m, Alexander 39.12).15
Sulla addresses the senate in order to prevent the senators from concerning
themselves (lµ pokupqaclome ?m, Sulla 30.4) with a slaughter taking place
simultaneously at his command. Pompey simply bribes the people with a
distribution of lands so as to make them tame and indistinctively (oqd³m
13 A very similar case is Agis 12.3, where Plutarch talks about the limits of the ephors’
power in Sparta: when both kings are in agreement, it would be unlawful (paqamºlyr)
for the ephors to meddle (pokupqaclome?m) disobliging the kings.
14 Cf. also Eumenes 3.14: Perdiccas is there said not to interfere (lgd³m…
pokupqaclomoOmtor) in Eumenes’ arrangements of the affairs of Cappadocia.
15 Pokupqaclos¼mg and related words are repeatedly used by Plutarch to refer to women
meddling in men’s affairs. See Pyrrhus 29.12, Agis 7.5, and Comparison Lycurgus-Numa
3.10.
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pokupqaclom_m, Pompey 48.3) approve of the decisions he proposed to be
voted.
More generally, the mob is repeatedly characterised as meddlesome.
Pericles, for example, takes measures in order to lighten the city of this idle and
meddlesome mass (pokupq²clomor ewkou, Pericles 11.6).16 Hand in hand with
this meddlesomeness goes a tendency for revolutionary ideas, as is clear from
the combination of the verbs pokupqaclome ?m and meyteq¸feim, which occurs
twice in the Lives (Phocion 29.5, and Artaxerxes 6.1).
What Pericles also tries to restrict, at a certain point, is the Athenians’
imperialism (peqi´jopte tµm pokupqaclos¼mgm, Pericles 21.1), urging them
towards a more defensive policy: he foresaw that they would ruin themselves
by undertaking too much (pokupqaclomoOmter, Comparison Pericles-Fabius 2.3),
as it indeed turned out. In other Lives as well, Plutarch uses pokupqaclos¼mg
and related words to refer to imperialistic policies of various people.17
In the Life of Crassus, Vibius sends out a slave to provide Crassus with food
when the latter had hidden himself in a cave. He orders the slave to put the
food nearby without investigating anything, threatening to kill him in case he
does (pqoeip½m pokupqaclomoOmti h²matom, 4.4). Pokupqaclome ?m here refers
to wondering about things one should simply accept.18 Finally, there are two
passages in the Lives where people are eavesdropping and purposely over-
hearing things which do not regard them. One of them is Caesar’s barber, who
thus finds out about a plot against his master (¡tajoust_m ja·
pokupqaclom_m, Caesar 49.4). The other passage is about the traitors who
moved among the Syracusans in order to overhear other people’s talks
(pokupqaclomoOmter, Dion 28.1) and report the news to the tyrants.19
1.3 Plutarch, then, uses pokupqaclome ?m/pokupq²clym/pokupqaclos¼mg, in
both On Curiosity and the Lives. Etymologically, the words point to busying
oneself (-pqaclome ?m) a lot (poku-).20 ‘Busying oneself’ refers primarily to a
physical activity, but by extension also to a mental one. ‘A lot’ means with
16 A similar characterisation of the mob is to be found in Coriolanus 20.3.
17 See Cimon 16.2, Sulla 5.6, and also Phocion 27.8.
18 So do the people in Pericles 23.1: although Pericles presented the people with a bill
containing dubious expenses, they make no problems (lµ pokupqaclom¶sar) and carry
out no investigation. In the case of Rome, the nobles do not allow the multitude to
inquire about or busy themselves with (oqd³ pokupqaclome?m, Romulus 27.8) Romulus’
disappearance during a storm at the end of his life.
19 In a positive variant, Lycurgus encourages the young Spartans to exert social control
(pokupqaclome?m, Lycurgus 18.4) by making them observe and comment on their
fellow citizens. Also, the inquiry (pokupqaclomoOmter, 19.6) by the Achaean horsemen
under Philopoemen’s command after they had abandoned him to the enemy, is
presented as justified.
20 For a short survey of its possible meanings, see also Demont, 28.
Genres and Their Implications: Meddlesomeness in On Curiosity versus the Lives 301
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
more than one’s own things or more than one is supposed to busy oneself with
– antonymous to t± 2autoO pq²tteim. For indeed, the common denominator
behind all uses of the word seems to be the opposition of self and others:
carrying out one’s own versus someone else’s tasks, ruling oneself versus ruling
others, self-scrutiny versus ‘scientific’ research or versus meddlesomeness, etc.
Yet the uses and meanings of the word in On Curiosity and the Lives differ
quite thoroughly. In On Curiosity, Plutarch adhibits the words in a particular,
ethical-philosophical sense: the polypragmo¯n is a man frequenting public places
in order to get and give information about others; a man with a preference for
evils, which connects his pokupqaclos¼mg with bad affections as envy and
Schadenfreude ; a man who slanders and reveals secrets. Such pokupqaclos¼mg
is a mental inquiry into the wrong object.
The Lives present a wholly different picture. Here pokupqaclome?m
/pokupq²clym/pokupqaclos¼mg are used mainly with political implications:
carrying out someone else’s tasks, imperialism, meddling with political
decisions by people who ought not to, sycophantism – these are what
pokupqaclome?m refers to in the Lives. Conversely, references to
pokupqaclos¼mg as a mental inquiry are rather scarce. Vibius’ slave, and
Caesar’s barber are two examples.21 What also catches the eye, is that none of
the heroes of the Lives is a pokupq²clym : Camillus and Eumenes explicitly
refuse to undertake an action which could be interpreted as political
pokupqaclos¼mg, and in many cases, as we have seen, heroes (try to) restrict
other people’s pokupqaclos¼mg as well.
The word pokupqaclos¼mg, then, does occur in the Lives as well, but is
never applied to the protagonists in the sense it has in On Curiosity.
Conversely, to my knowledge, none of these protagonists is described in
another terminology to exhibit the characteristics of On Curiosity’s poly-
pragmo¯n.22
2. The difference in the use of ‘pokupqaclos¼mg’, then, is too clear-cut to be
the result of pure chance. All the more so, as it is striking how few23 –
21 The only other instances of pokupqaclos¼mg as a mental inquiry in the Lives are
quoted in note 18 above. Note, however, that Plutarch here uses the verb
pokupqaclom´y, which, much better than the adjective pokupq²clym, can denote a
once-only instance of polypragmosyne¯.
22 Peqieqc¸a, which is sometimes used as a synonym for pokupqaclos¼mg in On Curiosity,
occurs but four times in the Lives, and is said about someone else than the protagonist
(Pompey 55.3 and Alexander 2.9), or used in another sense (Gracchi 2.4), or, once,
explicitly denied for the protagonist (Demetrius 12.8). For Plutarch’s lost treatise Peq·
peqieqc¸ar, see Volpe-Cacciatore, 143, n. 60.
23 Apart from Odysseus and Socrates, Cyrus and Alexander are the only ones. Rusticus,
on the other hand, is a contemporary example.
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compared, that is, to Plutarch’s usual practice in most of the popular-
philosophical writings of the Moralia – are the historical examples of either bad
or good attitudes concerning the vice under discussion given in On Curiosity.24
All this begs for an explanation. More specifically, one wonders why none of
the protagonists of the Lives is (represented as) a polypragmo¯n, although Plutarch
on the one hand apparently found polypragmosyne¯ important enough to
dedicate a whole work to it, and, on the other hand, did have an eye for the
vices of the protagonists of the Lives. This is the question the next pages will
try to answer.
2.1 On Curiosity and the Lives are clearly different kinds of writings. In line
with this, they are the heirs of different traditions. It is noteworthy that these
traditions apparently tended to conceive of pokupqaclos¼mg in different ways
as well.
Thus, the senses that pokupqaclos¼mg takes in the Lives recur in
historiographical works. Herodotus (Histories 3.15.5), for example,25 applies
the word to the behaviour of Psammenitus, the Egyptian king who was
captured by Cambyses but, having gained admiration, enjoyed a good regime.
Herodotus says of him that “had he but been wise enough to mind his own
business (lµ pokupqgclom´eim), he would have so far won back Egypt as to be
governor of it”. Instead, he raised a revolt among the Egyptians, and was
therefore sentenced to death. The word was also used in historiographical
works to denote the interfering of one city or state in another city’s or state’s
affairs.26 Thus, the opponents, both internal and external, of Athens’
imperialism could use pokupqaclos¼mg to denote that policy.27
The implementation of pokupqaclos¼mg in On Curiosity, on the other
hand, may have its roots in comedy. Several new comedies now lost had
Pokupq²clym as their titles,28 and among the verses ascribed to Menander is
the following:
24 See also Nikolaidis (forthcoming), 4.
25 Another example can be found in Xenophon, Hellenica 1.6.3.2.
26 Although Athens is the case in point par excellence, other examples can be given as
well: Polybius (e. g. Histories 2.13.3) applied the word to Rome’s foreign policy, and
Isocrates (Areopagiticus 80.4) to the barbarians.
27 See for example Thucydides 6.87.3, Aristophanes, Acharnians 833, and Isocrates, On
Peace 26.4, 30.2, 58.7, and 108.1. Allison pointed to the fact that the word
pokupqaclos¼mg occurs only a few times in fifth century literature. Although this is
correct, the question of whether cities and people ought to interfere with others seems
to have been a vexed one at the time. As a result, many scholars have discussed it. See
esp. Ehrenberg, Adkins, 311–317, and Demont, esp. 191–252.
28 Inglese 1996, 16 n. 23, lists the authors. Note also that Plutarch himself in 515D inserts
a comic verse reproaching the polypragmo¯n.
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pokupqaclome ?m lµ bo¼kou !kkºtqia jaj².
Don’t inquire into other people’s evils ! (Monostichoi 1.583/703).29
The clearest parallel for polypragmosyne¯ as intended in On Curiosity, however, is
to be found in a passage of Philo – in an ethical passage of a philosophical
work, that is. For indeed, Philo describes the worthless man (b vaOkor) as
hurrying (letatq´wei) to every possible meeting of people, and exhibiting a
meddlesome curiosity (pokupq²clomor peqieqc¸ar) about other people’s
(2t´qym) affairs, envious (vhome ?m) if they are good, joyful (Fdeshai) if bad.30
Although Plutarch, as all authors, certainly has been influenced by his own
reading, to propose this as the only, or even the main, reason why he used the
word pokupqaclos¼mg in On Curiosity and the Lives in the way he did, would
be to go back to 19th and early 20th century Quellenforschung, reducing
Plutarch to and explaining him from his ‘sources’. Fortunately, scholarship has
gone a long way since, showing Plutarch to be much more original and
autonomous than had often been assumed.
Yet on the other hand, it is true that Plutarch, to my knowledge at least,31
does not ‘invent’ qualities for his heroes. Theoretically, it is therefore possible
that the only reason why Plutarch does not characterize any of the heroes of
his Lives as a polypragmo¯n, is that they had not been characterized as such before
him. This, however, does not resolve, but only defer the problem: the
question remains why they had not been represented as such before – if not by
early authors, who wrote at times when pokupqaclos¼mg was not yet being
used in an ethical sense, then at least since Menander. Moreover, even if
authors before him did not label it so, Plutarch could have interpreted the
behaviour they ascribed to certain historical figures as polypragmosyne¯.
2.2 If, thus, the ‘sources’ offer at best a partial explanation, what else can be
said that matters to our question? Why is none of the protagonists of the Lives
subject to the affection (p²hor) polypragmosyne¯, although they all are so to other
affections? What, in other words, distinguishes polypragmosyne¯ from, say,
29 My translation. On curiosity in Menander, see Mette.
30 On Abraham, 20–21. Like Plutarch in his On Curiosity, Philo here interprets
pokupqaclos¼mg in an ethical sense: he opposes the worthless man to the man of
worth (b d ‘ !ste ?or), stresses the importance of learning to draw distinctions, and
explains the interest in evil things by reference to affections. Notwithstanding, Philo
did not dedicate an entire writing to the subject, nor propose any concrete solution for
it, let alone a therapy enabling and teaching his readers to come to that solution.
31 Cf. Pelling 1980, and idem 1988, 284 and n. 5.
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ambition or anger32 in a way so as to make the former, contrarily to the other
affections, unfit for a hero?
In On Curiosity, as was shown above, Plutarch presents the polypragmo¯n as a
man who, for want of better things to do, loiters about in town nosing into
other people’s affairs, and rejoicing when these are evil. The picture Plutarch
draws is not only one-sided, focussing exclusively on polypragmosyne¯ at the
expense of any other characteristics, but even caricatural.33 For indeed, the
polypragmo¯n staged in On Curiosity is worse than any really existing person:34
continuously and exclusively focussed on other people’s evils, he has no
business of his own to take care of at all. As such, the polypragmo¯n is not
realistic, does not exist. And what is more, part of On Curiosity’s effectiveness
depends upon this fact:35 the reader, who exhibits some of the behaviour of
the polypragmo¯n but is, on the other hand, his better, is encouraged to distance
himself even further from a figure presented in so repulsive a way. If, then, the
readers of On Curiosity estimate themselves ‘above’ the polypragmo¯n, then they
definitely estimate the heroes of the Lives to be so, as these are not only (at least
supposed to be)36 real human beings, but eminent ones.
For indeed, the fact that Plutarch wrote their Life implies that they were
historically important enough to make it to the annals of history, and
therefore, they would have made it to the top. In order to do so, they would
32 Note that Plutarch does not term the imperialism of, say, Alexander, pokupqaclos¼mg
– a meaning that word could easily have in a political or military context –, but sees it as
part of his vikomij¸a or vikotil¸a – which implies self- instead of other-centredness. In
line with what will be said in a moment about pokupqaclos¼mg and narrative, this
confirms that Plutarch conceives of his protagonists’ imperial ambitions as (part of)
their goal in life, and not as yet another aim. On ambition in the Lives, see, e. g.,
Frazier, Duff, 83–89, and Stadter (forthcoming).
33 Compare also the fact that Plutarch implemented pokupqaclos¼mg in a quite
idiosyncratic way. For indeed, apart from the fact that he was the first author to
dedicate a whole treatise to pokupqaclos¼mg, he was the only one to lay so much stress
on, for example, the duration of pokupqaclos¼mg and the fact that it is an affection.
Pokupqaclos¼mg as conceived of by Plutarch in On Curiosity appears nowhere else in
Greek literature in so elaborate a way.
34 Precisely this may have made the polypragmo¯n such an interesting character for comedy
(cf. above, n. 28), especially if one takes into account Aristotle’s comments in Poetics 2,
1448a16–18 on the difference between comedy and tragedy regarding the imitated
object. On this passage, see Else, 82–89.
35 What Pelling 1995 wrote in another context regarding Plutarch’s ethics thus applies
here as well: “There is evidently a two-way process here, with audience ready for the
text, and the text affecting the audience.” (p. 247).
36 For Theseus and Romulus, see Pelling 1999.
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have needed so much time and energy as to leave none for trivialities as the
ones the polypragmo¯n goes after. This is confirmed in On Curiosity:37
jah²peq c±q b Syjq²tgr paq-mei vuk²tteshai t_m bqyl²tym fsa lµ peim_mtar
1sh¸eim !mape¸hei ja· t_m pol²tym fsa p¸meim lµ dix_mtar, ovty wqµ ja· Bl÷r t_m
heal²tym ja· !jousl²tym vuk²tteshai ja· ve¼ceim fsa jqate ? ja· pqos²cetai
to»r lgd³m deol´mour. b coOm JOqor oqj 1bo¼keto tµm P²mheiam Qde ?m, !kk± toO
)q²spou k´comtor ¢r %niom h´ar eUg t¹ t/r cumaij¹r eWdor, oqjoOm, 5vg, di± toOto
l÷kkom aqt/r !vejt´om7 eQ c±q rp¹ soO peishe·r !vijo¸lgm pq¹r aqt¶m, Usyr %m le
p²kim !mape¸seiem aqtµ ja· lµ swok²fomta voit÷m ja· he÷shai ja· paqajah/shai
pqo´lemom pokk± t_m spoud/r !n¸ym. blo¸yr oqd ‘ b )k´namdqor eQr exim Ekhe t/r
Daqe¸ou cumaij¹r 1jpqepest²tgr eWmai kecol´mgr, !kk± pq¹r tµm lgt´qa voit_m
aqt/r pqesbOtim owsam, oqw rp´leime tµm m´am ja· jakµm Qde ?m. (On Curiosity 522A)
For as Socrates used to advise the avoidance of such foods as tempt us to eat when
we are not hungry and such drinks as tempt us to imbibe when we are not thirsty,
so we also should avoid and guard against such sights and sounds as master and
attract us without fulfilling any need of ours. Thus Cyrus was unwilling to see
Pantheia ; and when Araspes declared that the woman’s beauty was worth seeing,
Cyrus said, “Then this is all the more reason for keeping away from her. For if,
persuaded by you, I should go to her, perhaps she herself might tempt me, when I
couldn’t spare the time, to go to see her again and sit by her, to the neglect of
many important matters.” So too Alexander would not go to see Darius’ wife who
was said to be very beautiful, but although he visited her mother, an elderly
woman, he could not bring himself to see the young and beautiful daughter.
Cyrus and Alexander did not go to see a beautiful woman, for fear they might
be tempted to do so again when they had no time (lµ swok²fomta),38 and
thereby neglect matters worthy of attention. Cyrus’ words and Alexander’s
deeds reveal not only that they have more important things to do,39 but also
that they are aware of this fact and live accordingly.40 The polypragmo¯n, on the
contrary, is not taken by any serious activity. Yet the process is double-edged,
and the disease self-reinforcing: from being distracted by inscriptions on one’s
37 Cf. also the Comparison of Aristides and Cato, 4.2, where Plutarch, talking about poverty
because of soberness, industriousness, righteousness, and braveness, writes that “it is
impossible for a man to do great things when his thoughts are busy with little things”
(oq c±q 5sti pq²tteim lec²ka vqomt¸fomta lijq_m).
38 On Cyrus’ self-control regarding pleasure (Bdoma¸), see Xenophon, Cyropaideia 8.1.32,
and on this passage and the importance of timing in matters of pleasure, Foucault, 69.
In his essay How to Study Poetry 31C, Plutarch gives Cyrus’ behaviour towards
Pantheia as an example to be followed by those who are easily enamoured. There, the
stress is more on avoiding one’s passions to be kindled, here, on spending time – which
one may not have – at things one does not need.
39 For swok²feim/swok¶, see Stocks, Mikkola, Solmsen, and Demont, passim.
40 Odysseus, whom many readers might think to be a polypragmo¯n, is another example: he
does indeed ask the women he sees in Hades after all kinds of things, but never forgets
the aim of his descent into the underworld, nor his ultimate aim, to reach Ithaca. As a
result, Plutarch presents him as an example not of a polypragmo¯n, but of the contrary.
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way, the polypragmo¯n, over reacting to all stimuli indifferently, ends up having
no time for better things,41 absorbed as he is by his polypragmosyne¯.42
polypragmosyne¯ stands in the way of the great achievements43 reached by
men whose biography Plutarch would therefore want to write. The activities
of the polypragmo¯n on the one hand and of the protagonists of the Lives on the
other, then, are in a certain way mutually exclusive.
2.3 On a more technical level, the narrative character – typically telling the
story of a series of logically/chronologically related events44 – of Plutarch’s
Lives makes polypragmosyne¯ not so suited as an affection for the protagonists.
For indeed, whereas the Lives largely have a linear progression between their
protagonists’ birth and death, polypragmosyne¯ as understood in On Curiosity45 by
definition implies the absence of a (more or less) straight line, the polypragmo¯n
always being distracted from what he was heading for. Plutarch indeed
describes the polypragmo¯n as so fussy about whatever he happens to encounter,
that he appears as a person loitering around without any aim, just waiting for
anything (bad, preferably) to happen.46 Quite the contrary goes for the
protagonists of the Lives: they have high aspirations, well-defined objectives,
clear goals – as is typical not only for people who made it to the top, but also,
more technically speaking, for narratives.47
The narrative of the Lives, then, supposes progression, and this progression
is largely dependent on their protagonists’ strivings. Whereas other affections
41 diatqiba¸, 515D, 515E, 519F, and 521D.
42 diatq¸beim, 517E; outû !swoke?tai, 518A; !swoko¼lemoi, 518E; pokupqaclom_m […]
peqipate?, 519A.
43 See, for a very clear example, Plutarch’s advice to the polypragmo¯n to list all his
achievements in § 10.
44 For a discussion of narrativity, see Van Gorp – Delabastita – Ghesquiere, 295–296, and
Baldick, 165–166.
45 On Curiosity is clearly not a narrative work. Notwithstanding, it does contain some
narrative anecdotes. The historical ones, as has been noted, are much less frequent,
however, than in other, kindlike works of the Moralia. On the use of narrative
anecdotes in non-narrative literature, see Nash. See also the next note.
46 This is not in contradiction to what was said above about Plutarch sketching the
development of polypragmosyne¯: Plutarch does not tell the story of (part of the life of) a
polypragmo¯n, he proposes different steps of a therapy which correspond to certain acts
that are typical for polypragmones in general. For example, Plutarch does not say that
“after and/or because of having read inscriptions on walls, polypragmo¯n X turned to
nosing into people’s houses, and was ruined in such and such way as a result of it”, but
that “it is not difficult to accustom oneself to not nosing into people’s houses, as that
generally brings no advantages”.
47 See Propp, esp. 80, Greimas, esp. 172–191, Toolan, 93–96, and Rosenboom, 25–42.
Genres and Their Implications: Meddlesomeness in On Curiosity versus the Lives 307
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
may cross the heroes’ main ambitions,48 polypragmosyne¯ does not merely cross,
but ends them: the polypragmo¯n does not act, but merely re-act.49 As the end of
ambition would, in the Lives, imply the end of progression, polypragmosyne¯ is
not suited as an affection for the narrative texts that the Lives are.
3. A double conclusion can be drawn from the foregoing. On the one hand,
asking the question of why none of the protagonists of the Lives is represented
as subject to pokupqaclos¼mg as that word is understood in On Curiosity has
led to a better understanding of what exactly that word does mean in the latter
work. More specifically, it has become clear that the polypragmo¯n as sketched in
On Curiosity is a caricature, and, moreover, that the effectiveness of the work
at least partly depends upon this. Furthermore, the present study has also
shown polypragmosyne¯ to be something both ‘below’ the heroes of the Lives and
unfit for the narrative genre that the Lives are.
On the other hand, this implies that genres may play a – sometimes major
– role in determining how certain words are used, how certain ideas are
evoked: making the polypragmo¯n a caricature was useful in order for the treatise
On Curiosity to affect its readers’ behaviour. The fact that certain affections can
whereas other ones cannot be discussed in certain kinds of texts should,
conversely, be a warning for the interpretation of ‘historical truth’ about
people’s characters: even if a protagonist of the Lives would have exhibited an
aspect of the polypragmo¯n’s behaviour, polypragmosyne¯ was not an interesting
affection to be discussed in a narrative text. In case Plutarch has, in this matter,
undergone heavy influence from his sources, this warning extends to these
sources as well.
In line with this, it would be interesting to examine the degree up to
which the fact that the Moralia and the Lives are different kinds of texts had a
bearing on the ethical programme Plutarch treats and promotes, and if, for
example, what has been said here about polypragmosyne¯ goes for affections such
as talkativeness and compliance as well. Do the Moralia and the Lives present
the same canon of virtues? If so, to what extent did genre-conventions
48 For indeed, the fact the protagonists of the Lives are guided by their goals, does not
mean that they (all) actually reach their goals, or that they cannot be deflected from
pursuing it by certain affections. In fact, it is this very fact that makes them into
interesting subjects for Plutarch’s ethical project. Plutarch indeed renders negative
characteristics as well, without, however, being malicious. See also Duff, 58–59, and
Swain, 146, about Plutarch’s own practice in the Lives. Anger, conversely, is an
example of an affection well suited for narrative: something happens to the protagonist ;
the protagonist gets angry and strives for revenge; he either punishes his wrongdoer or
tragically meets with disaster heroically – but in any case, there is a strong causal and
temporal progression.
49 Many verbs are indeed in the passive mode.
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influence the concrete implementations in both groups of works? Or if not:
what role did genres play in this? Yet not only are these different questions,
answering them would also exceed by far the scope of this paper. With my
contribution, however, I hope to have given an example concerning one
affection, and shown what results can be expected.
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